Unions in a General Equilibrium Model of Firm Formation
在企业形成的一般均衡模型中引入工会，发现大企业更可能成立工会，工会企业生产率更高且管理更好，但工会会扭曲职业选择决策从而降低经济效率。
Unions are introduced into a general equilibrium model of firm formation. The author finds, under reasonable conditions, that la rge firms are more likely to be unionized, and that unionized firms a re more productive and "better managed" than nonunion firms of the same size. As well, unions reduce economic efficiency by distorting t he "occupation choice" decision between managing a firm and working in one. Perhaps surprisingly, this distortion persists even when ind ividual union contracts set both wages and employment in a fully effi cient manner but can disappear when the mechanism that allocates prop erty rights to union jobs is changed in certain ways. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.