Wage Determination in the Federal Government: The Role of Constituents and Bureaucrats
探讨联邦政府不同机构间相似雇员的工资差异，发现机构选民规模小、组织度高且官僚利益趋同的机构工资更高，政治因素可解释约三分之二的机构间工资差异。
The existence of significant wage differentials among "similar" individuals employed by different agencies in the federal government is explored. The theoretical framework proposes that the underlying reason for these differentials may be linked to the political influence exhibited by the constituencies and bureaucracies of federal agencies. The empirical results indicate that employees in federal agencies with small and well-organized constituencies and with bureaucracies that apparently share common interests generally receive higher wage rates. In fact, a small number of variables measuring these political factors explains about two-thirds of interagency wage differentials.