Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination
构建了一个理论模型，分析游说集团如何在政治捐款影响贸易政策的框架下内生形成。研究发现，在特定条件下，自由贸易可能成为均衡结果，而资产分配不平等会催生更多游说集团并带来更多保护。
This paper provides a theory of lobby formation within a framework in which trade policy is determined through political contributions. Under certain conditions, free trade turns out to be an equilibrium outcome either when the government has a high affinity for political contributions or when it cares a great deal about social welfare. Moreover, greater inequality in asset distribution results in a greater number of lobbies and, in most cases, more protection for each of these lobbies. Furthermore, industries with higher levels of capital stock, fewer capitalists, more inelastic demand, and smaller geographical dispersion are the ones that get organized.