On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical
研究涉及两个风险中性方的意外事故，分析责任规则如何分散行动选择，并证明在允许惩罚性赔偿时，即使代理人不同质也能实现最优行动，同时给出避免某些个体在事故中预期更好的条件。
This paper is about accidents involving two risk-neutral parties. Both parties engage in actions that are profitable but affect the magnitude of possible bilateral accidents. We analyse how the action choices can be decentralized by liability rules that assign the accident costs to the two parties. If we allow for punitive damages, we can implement the first-best actions by a liability rule even if agents are not identical. Under this liability rule some individuals may be in expectation better off in the event of an accident than in the event of no accident. We provide conditions under which this problem does not arise.