受监管、受保险中介模型中的公开市场操作

Open-Market Operations in a Model of Regulated, Insured Intermediaries

Journal of Political Economy · 1980
被引 32
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

论证了在政府交易成本与资产组合无关时,公开市场购买具有通缩效应并能提升福利,且该结论在存在准备金要求限制受保险中介规模的情况下依然成立。

Abstract

In "The Inefficiency of Interest-bearing National Debt" (J.P.E. [April 1979]), we argued that private sector transaction costs are needed in order to explain interest on government debt. It follows that if the government's transaction costs do not depend on its portfolio, then, barring special circumstances, an open-market purchase is deflationary and welfare improving. In this paper we show that this result can survive a potentially relevant special circumstances: reserve requirements which limit the size of insured intermediaries.

公开市场操作准备金要求受保险中介福利效应