Reserve Requirements, Deposit Insurance and Monetary Control
提出将美联储的货币政策职能与联邦存款保险公司的存款保险职能合并，以消除准备金要求及其税收，同时实现对目标货币总量的精确周度控制，并简化银行管理任务。
RESERVE REQUIREMENTS ARE USUALLY JUSTIFIED on grounds that they enhance the monetary authority' s control over a monetary aggregate. Using reserve requirements to control a monetary aggregate has long posed a problem for economists in devising an institutional structure in which to conducl monetary policy. Higher reserve requirements give more accurate control over a target monetary aggregate, but they also impose higher taxes on the monetary aggregate. These higher taxes lead to the use of lower reservable instruments as substitutes for deposits included in the monetary aggregate and thereby alter the significance of the target. Building on a reserve computation system presented earlier in this journal [8], this paper proposes a change in institutional structure that essentially merges the monetary policy functions of the Federal Reserve (Fed) with the deposit insuring authority of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This proposed system would provide accurate weekly control over the target monetary aggregate while completely eliminating present reserve requirements and the reserve requirement tax. It further improves monetary policy by helping insulate the target monetary aggregate from innovations that would substitute new financial instruments for components of the target monetary aggregate. The proposal would greatly simplify banks' portfolio and reserve management tasks. It would eliminate the need for a