一般均衡背景下最小化社会贫困的预算规则

Budgetary rules to minimize societal poverty in a general equilibrium context

Journal of Development Economics · 1992
被引 60
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

推导了在一般均衡背景下,如何将外生预算分配给不同社会经济群体以最大程度减少社会贫困的预算规则,并通过模拟展示了经济互动对最优分配和减贫效果的重要性。

Abstract

This paper derives budgetary rules for the allocation of an exogenously supplied budget to mutually exclusive socioeconomic groups so that the maximum reduction of poverty for society as a whole is attained. Budgetary rules are derived for two mechanisms of intra-group benefit distribution and for the cases where the effects of economic interaction within and between groups is considered and where it is not. A computer simulation of the budgetary rules on a hypothetical economy demonstrates the importance of economic interaction both to the optimal allocation of benefits and to the resulting reduction in poverty.

预算规则减贫一般均衡群体间经济互动