Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement
质疑了经济学中罚款是无成本转移的假设，论证了将罚款设定为最高并非最优，并提出了考虑规避和筛查行为的最优执法模型。
A standard assumption in the economic literature on crime and punishment is that fines are costless transfers. Given this assumption, several economists have argued that it is optimal to set the fine for engaging in a proscribed activity as high as possible.' The argument is a simple one. Raising the probability of a fine is costly, since it requires devoting more resources to monitoring and apprehending individuals. In contrast, raising the magnitude of a fine is costless. Therefore, the least costly way to achieve a given expected fine is to set the fine as high as possible, presumably equal to the offender's wealth, and adjust its probability so that the desired expected fine is obtained.