The Confusion of Is and Ought in Game Theoretic Contexts
从贝叶斯视角探讨博弈论研究中规范性陈述与实证性陈述的混淆问题，指出这种混淆源于认知行为作为科学对象时的认识论和方法论难题，并阻碍了决策行为预测与指导的发展。
This paper explores the distinction between normative and positive theoretical statements in a game theoretic context from a Bayesian perspective. Normative and positive theoretical statements are often confused in decision making research. The confusion results from some unique epistemological and methodological problems associated with cognitive behavior as an object for scientific inquiry. The confusion persists because of poor model validation procedures which are themselves further complicated by the confusion. The confusion greatly impedes the development of more useful prescriptions for and predictions of human decision behavior. From a Bayesian perspective which acknowledges the importance of incomplete information and imperfect theories of behavior, the confusion is unnecessary.