Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a threshold public good: An experimental investigation
通过实验比较三种返还规则（无返还、按比例返还、利用返还）对自愿贡献阈值公共物品的影响，发现无返还规则下更易达到纳什均衡，且不同规则下贡献的方差显著不同。
This study reports the effects of rebate rules on voluntary contributions to a threshold public good. Rebate rules specify how excess contributions, over the threshold amount are distributed. We examine three rebate rules experimentally: a no rebate policy where excess contributions are discarded, a proportional rebate policy where excess contributions are rebated proportionally to an individual's contribution, and a utilization rebate policy where excess contributions provide some continuous public good. Significantly more Nash equilibrium outcomes are observed under the no rebate treatment than under either of the other two. Interestingly, the variance of contributions differs significantly between rebate treatments.