Regulation with 20-20 Hindsight: "Heads I Win, Tails You Lose"?
研究监管者用事后眼光惩罚企业不良结果而非不良决策的影响，发现基于避免成本的回顾审查可减少企业过度投资大型风险项目，但需调整允许回报率以保持预期利润非负。
Regulators are commonly accused of using 20-20 hindsight to punish a firm for bad outcomes rather than bad decisions; it is often thought that such penalties lead to underinvestment by the firm. I find that this expectation is not borne out when retrospective review is based on the firm's avoided costs. In a Joskow-type model, hindsight review mitigates the firm's tendency to build oversized risky projects, moving the firm closer to the cost-minimizing level of investment. In a rate-of-return model, the firm's allowed rate of return may have to be increased to keep expected profits nonnegative. If this is done, hindsight review does not affect the firm's investment level, but it does correct the (risk-neutral) firm's tendency to pay an excessive premium to eliminate construction cost uncertainty.