Optimal Public Sector Wages
构建了一个包含搜索与匹配摩擦的动态随机一般均衡模型，研究最优公共部门工资政策，发现高工资会导致失业增加，且最优工资取决于两部门的摩擦程度，技术冲击下公共部门工资应顺周期。
I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions to determine the optimal public sector wage policy. Public sector wages are crucial in achieving efficient allocation of jobs. High wages induce too many unemployed to queue for public sector jobs, in turn raising unemployment. The optimal wage depends on the frictions in the two sectors. Following technology shocks, public sector wages should be pro‐cyclical and deviations from the optimal policy significantly increase the volatility of unemployment.