Procedural Rationality and Equilibrium Trust
研究委托人和代理人群体中稳态信任的决定因素，委托人使用有限理性程序从经验中学习。对于任何代理人类型分布，委托人行为的长期分布被刻画。两种程序下委托人行为异质性持续存在，且更复杂的程序可能导致更差的表现。
This article examines the determinants of steady state trust in a population of principals and agents, where the former learn from experience using boundedly rational procedures. For any distribution of agent types, the long-run distribution of principal behaviour is characterised. Heterogeneity in the behaviour of principals persists under both the sampling procedure ( Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998 ) and the maximum average procedure ( Rustichini, 2003 ). Despite its greater sophistication, the maximum average procedure can result in poorer performance than the sampling procedure, both from the perspective of the principal and also with respect to aggregate payoffs. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008.