Equal Contributions and Unequal Risks in a North-east Thai Village Funeral Society
研究了泰国东北部村庄丧葬协会为何对所有家庭收取相同费用，尽管部分家庭死亡风险更高。发现这并非信息不对称所致，而是源于对预期回报的漠视、互助意愿以及对透明度和简单性的追求，该规则高效且仅导致轻微逆向选择。
Village funeral societies in north-east Thailand collect equal contributions from all participating households, even though some households are much more likely to experience deaths and receive money from the funeral society than others. The societies' use of the equal contributions rule is not an outcome of the asymmetric distribution of information on risks. It reflects, instead, an ambivalence over the relevance of expected returns, a willingness to subsidise fellow villagers, and the need to maximise simplicity and transparency to safeguard against mismanagement and corruption. The equal contributions rule is efficient, in that it leads to low administrative costs, has no clearly superior alternatives, and creates only minor adverse selection.