Incentive Alignment, CEO Pay Level, and Firm Performance: A Case of “Heads I Win, Tails You Lose”?
研究发现，采用长期薪酬（如股票期权）的CEO总薪酬更高，但企业绩效反而低于采用年终薪酬调整的公司，质疑了长期薪酬的激励效果。
Abstract In recent years, rewarding CEOs with long‐term forms of compensation (e.g., stock options, performance plans, restricted stock) has become more popular than using year‐end pay adjustments. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence to support the benefits of this trend. This study found that the benefits of long‐term compensation flowed primarily to CEOs as they received significantly greater levels of total compensation than CEOs in firms that emphasized year‐end pay adjustments. Paradoxically, however, firms that emphasized year‐end pay adjustments performed significantly better than firms that were heavy users of long‐term forms of contingent compensation. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.