Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
分析了中介服务提供商之间的不完全价格竞争模型，重点关注互联网信息中介的特征，如间接网络外部性、非排他性服务和基于用户身份的价格歧视，并探讨了市场结构的效率及中介的定价策略。
We analyze a model of imperfect price competition between intermediation service providers. We insist on features that are relevant for informational intermediation via the Internet: the presence of indirect network externalities, the possibility of using the nonexclusive services of several intermediaries, and the widespread practice of price discrimination based on users' identity and on usage. Efficient market structures emerge in equilibrium, as well as some specific form of inefficient structures. Intermediaries have incentives to propose non-exclusive services, as this moderates competition and allows them to exert market power. We analyze in detail the pricing and business strategies followed by intermediation services providers. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.