Capital Structure and Ownership Distribution of Tender Offer Targets: An Empirical Study
检验了要约收购目标公司的资本与所有权结构，发现目标公司在控制权争夺中会提高杠杆，且杠杆增加幅度在要约被反对或未成功时更大，所有权结构对要约成功有解释力。
This study investigates the capital and ownership structure of firms receiving tender offers. Predictions of control-driven models developed by Haris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) and value-maximizing models developed by Israel (1991, 1992) are examined. The study reports results consistent with the predictions that: 1) target firms increase leverage during control contests, 2) leverage increases are higher when the tender offer is opposed, 3) leverage increases are higher when the tender offer is unsuccessful, and 4) ownership structure is important to explaining the success of tender offers. When tested jointly with other independent variables, only capital structure is statistically significant in explaining both management's opposition and the success of a tender offer.