拍卖市场竞争加剧的价格效应

The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets

Review of Economics and Statistics · 1987
被引 148
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

利用免税债券、海上石油地块和国家森林木材的数据,检验了竞标者数量增加对中标价的影响,发现更多竞标者显著降低卖方中标价,且最大顺序统计量比第二顺序统计量或1/N拟合更好。

Abstract

Bidding theory predicts low er selling winning bids (higher buying winning bids) as numbers of bidders incre ase. Alternative versions predict that winning bids fall (rise) with the second order statistic, the maximum order statistic, or 1/N. The authors test these pre dictions using data on underwriters' spreads on tax exempt bonds, offshore oil t racts, and National Forest timber. They estimate winning bids using general vari ables for the product and dummies for 1, 2, . . .11 bidders. In all cases mor e bidders meansignificantly lower (selling) winning bids. The expected maximum order statistic fits better than either the second order statistic or1/N, in te n out of twelve cases. Copyright 1987 by MIT Press.

拍卖理论竞标者数量中标价格实证检验