Best Fit Social Choices: An Alternative to Arrow
提出一种替代阿罗社会福利函数的社会选择方法，通过定义偏好与排序的一致程度来构建“最佳拟合”社会排序，避免了阿罗的独立性和帕累托条件，证明了非独裁社会选择的可行性，并分析了多数一致等性质。
This paper explores an approach to social choice which is an alternative to Arrow's social welfare function. We consider 'best fit' social rankings for any individual preferences through the definition of levels of agreement between preferences and rankings. We thereby avoid the pairwise approach of Arrow's independence and Pareto conditions, and we demonstrate the possibility of non-dictatorial social choice. Mie consider the rationality implications of a non-unique outcome, and determine additional properties, including majority-consistency, of the Condorcet process for determining the rankings. The approach also allows an interpretation of Sen's 'impossibility of a Paretian liberal' in terms of individual agreement.