Agency Costs and the Limits of Integration
识别了一种因企业内部代理关系产生的整合成本，当委托人无法完全承诺长期合同且代理人拥有私人信息时，整合虽能带来互补收益，但也会增加代理人租金，可能大到足以限制原本有利可图的整合。
In this article I identify a type of integration cost that is associated with agency relations within the firm. This cost arises when the firm's principal cannot fully commit to long-term contracts with the firm's agents, and these agents have private information. In the model, integration can lead to value enhancements through the realization of complementarity gains. But this will also lead to larger rents, which is costly for the principal. I show that this type of cost may be sufficiently large to act as an effective limit for integrations that are otherwise profitable.