Rational Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts
专业预测者是否提供真实无偏的预测？模型显示，即使预测者信息相同，也会因用户类型不同而策略性地给出分散的预测，实证支持这一理论。
Do professional forecasters provide their true unbiased estimates, or do they behave strategically? In our model, forecasters have common information, confer actively, and thus know the true pdf of future outcomes. Intensive users of economic forecasts monitor forecasters' performance closely; occasional users are drawn to the forecaster who fared best in the previous period. In the resulting Nash equilibrium, even though economists have identical expectations, they make a range of projections that mimics the true probability distribution of the forecast variable. Those whose wages depend most on publicity produce forecasts that differ most from the consensus. Empirical evidence supports the model.