Wealth Reduction in White Knight Bids
研究发现近80%的白衣骑士在竞标公告日附近出现负异常收益，且损失持续；从福利经济学看，控制权争夺未达到帕累托最优，仅满足希克斯-卡尔多补偿原则。
The paper investigates the value changes experienced by white knights when they are involved in corporate control contests. Close to 80% of the white knights incur a negative abnormal return for the two-day window ending on the date of their bid. The losses persist for longer windows on either side of the event. We examine a set of matched-trios where all parties to the control contest are exchange-listed, and observe that from a welfare economics perspective, these contests do not lead to Pareto superior states, but meet the weaker efficiency criterion of the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle.