The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection
研究了共同群体身份如何改善协调博弈中的效率，通过实验室最小努力博弈实验发现，显著群体身份能促使内部协调到高效均衡，并提出了群体依赖的社会偏好模型。
When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments.