A Comparison of Posted-Offer and Double-Auction Pricing Institutions
通过实验比较标价拍卖与双向拍卖两种定价机制，发现标价拍卖下价格更高、效率更低，且该效应受其他设计条件影响。
This paper presents an experimental study of a computerized "posted-offer" pricing mechanism that captures many of the basic institutional features of retail exchange in the U.S. Posted-offer market performance is evaluated relative to "double-auction" market performance using two supply and demand designs. Subject experience with the trading mechanism is explicitly considered as an experimental treatment variable. The market data suggest that prices tend to be higher and efficiency lower under posted-offer pricing relative to double auction. However, the institutional effect appears to interact with other design conditions. When feasible, the predictive power of competitive, Nash, and limit-price theoretic equilibria are empirically evaluated.