Incomplete information and optimal market structure public purchases from private providers
构建了一个规范模型，分析公共采购中利润的社会成本、产品多样性、规模经济和不完全信息如何影响最优市场结构，发现不完全信息倾向于偏向单一采购，但在利润社会成本较大时可能反转。
Market structure is endogenized in a normative model of public procurement featuring a social cost of profit, product variety, economies of scale, and incomplete information about cost. Depending on parameters, either sole sourcing or dual sourcing might be optimal. However, if the social cost of profit is positive but not too large, incomplete information biases optimal market structure in favor of sole sourcing. On the other hand, this bias in favor of sole sourcing may be reversed if the social cost of profit is large. An application to the publicly financed treatment for drug abuse motivates the analysis.