Bilateral Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Collusion
研究双寡头差异化产品市场中，最惠客户条款能否让企业承诺高于伯特兰价格，发现除非需求满足特定条件，否则不存在双方都采用该条款的均衡。
In a two-period differentiated products duopoly model, most-favored-customer (MFC) pricing policies allow firms to commit to prices above the Bertrand prices. It is shown here, however, that unless a restrictive and unappealing assumption is made about demand, there is no equilibrium in which both firms adopt MFC policies. The restrictive assumption is that at least one firm's demand is more responsive to changes in its opponent's price than to changes in its own price; otherwise, firms have an incentive to deviate from a greater-than-Bertrand price in the first period.