Concurrent Renting and Selling in a Durable-Goods Monopoly under Threat of Entry
分析耐用品垄断者在面临未来进入威胁时，如何选择销售或出租合同。研究发现，威胁会改变垄断者的偏好，最优策略是混合出租与销售，使原垄断者获得类似斯塔克尔伯格领导者的利润。
This article analyzes the choice of contract (sales or rental) of a durable-goods monopolist facing a threat of future entry. Although in the absence of such a threat a monopolist would prefer to rent his entire output, we show that the threat of entry alters that preference. There is an optimal preentry contract mix, involving both rental and sales. If both firms behave as Cournot duopolists after entry, the optimal choice of preentry contracts enables the erstwhile monopolist to gain the same profits as he would if he behaved as a von Stackelberg leader.