Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market
利用一家代表性保险公司的合同数据，通过分析保费-免赔额菜单和需求函数，发现汽车碰撞保险市场存在逆向选择和信号传递的均衡，但拒绝了高风险者受低风险者补贴的假设。
The configuration of equilibrium in the market for automobile collision insurance is examined empirically by representing the premium-deductible menu and the demand function as a standard hedonic system. Using contractual data from a representative insurer, the authors estimate a reduced-form hedonic premium equation and the inverse of the marginal bid equation for insurance coverage. The data reveal an equilibrium with adverse selection and market signaling but lead the authors to reject the hypothesis that high risks receive contracts subsidized by low risks. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.