Bertrand Competition when Rivals' Costs are Unknown
研究发现，当企业不知道对手成本时，伯特兰竞争模型结论大变：企业定价高于边际成本并获得正预期利润，且市场均衡对结构敏感、激励进入。
The conclusions of the Bertrand model of competition are substantially altered by the presence of asymmetric information about rivals' costs. Asymmetric information eliminates the discontinuity in the Bertrand model and significantly alters the properties of the market equilibrium. In the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium when rivals' costs are unknown, firms price above marginal cost and have positive expected profit. The analysis is extended to franchise competition. The market equilibrium is sensitive to market structure and yields incentives for entry. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.