Risk selection and matching in performance‐based contracting
研究了基于绩效的合同如何通过影响患者与医疗提供者的匹配来改善治疗效果，利用缅因州数据发现该合同增加了转诊并改善了匹配，但对推诿患者的影响不显著。
This paper examines selection and matching incentives of performance-based contracting (PBC) in a model of patient heterogeneity, provider horizontal differentiation and asymmetric information. Treatment effectiveness is affected by the match between a patient's illness severity and a provider's treatment intensity. Before PBC, a provider's revenue is unrelated to treatment effectiveness; therefore, providers supply treatments even if their treatment intensities do not match with the patients' severities. Under PBC, budget allocation is positively related to treatment performance; patient-provider mismatch is reduced because patients are referred more often. Using data from the state of Maine, we show that PBC leads to more referrals and better match between illness severity and treatment intensity. Moreover, we find that PBC has a positive but insignificant effect on dumping.