Regulation and Legislative Choice
构建了一个层级模型，其中立法机构通过多数投票选择规制机构的授权范围，规制机构则对拥有私人成本信息的企业进行规制。模型分析了经济与政治维度如何影响规制结果，发现当选民支持与利益分配紧密挂钩时，立法机构会偏向消费者利益，导致总剩余未最大化；而通过要素就业向选民输送利益时，规制授权反而能提高预期总剩余。
Regulation has economic and political dimensions, both of which I endogenize in this hierarchical model in which a legislature chooses by majority rule the mandate of an agency that faithfully regulates a firm with private information about its costs. Sufficient conditions are given for an equilibrium to exist. If there is a strong electoral connection between the benefits delivered to constituents and their electoral support, the legislature will choose a regulatory mandate that favors consumer over producer interests and results in regulation that does not maximize expected total surplus. Political interest in delivering benefits to constituents through factor employment results in a regulatory mandate that yields greater expected total surplus.