The Economic Implications of Public Disability Insurance in the United States
回顾了社会保障残疾保险的劳动供给效应研究，指出忽略与其他保险的互动会导致估计偏差；通过最优保险模型表明，残疾时劳动减少和消费增加不一定意味着道德风险，并分析了《美国残疾人法案》对不同规模企业工人劳动供给的影响。
A review of previous analyses of labor supply effects of Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) concludes that estimates of labor supply effects and net social costs are upward biased because they ignore interactions between DI and other insurances. A model of optimal insurance, postinjury accommodations, and labor supply shows that reduction in labor supply and increase in consumption when disabled do not necessarily imply moral hazard. Optimal postinjury accommodations vary inversely with firm size. The Americans with Disabilities Act will reduce wages and labor supply of healthy workers, particularly in small firms. Effects on labor supply of the disabled are ambiguous.