Moral Hazard and Management Control in Just-in-Time Settings
建立模型分析准时制生产系统中库存与员工激励的相互作用，说明降低在制品库存如何影响道德风险和管理控制，对研究生产管理、激励设计的学者有参考价值。
In this paper, we model the management control and motivational aspects of Just-in-Time (JIT) production systems. Firms that implement JIT systems attempt to reduce work-in-process (VWP) inventories. Traditional inventory models, which balance the lost productivity from stockouts against the costs of carrying buffer stocks of inventory, have had limited success in explaining the benefits of JIT systems, perhaps because such models focus solely on material costs. In contrast, it is commonly claimed that the benefits of a JIT system do not come solely from reducing inventory-carrying costs (e.g., see Barrier [1992, p. 30]). In particular, Arthur [1994] and MacDuffie [1995] provide evidence that JIT systems are often accompanied by changes in the firm's human resource management policies. We model a multi-input production setting which integrates features of standard inventory models and standard principal-agent models to focus on the interaction between inventory and incentive issues. Specifically, we analyze how motivational issues with workers affect the optimal