Predatory Accommodation: Below-Cost Pricing without Exclusion in Intermediate Goods Markets
证明，当垄断零售商与两个替代品供应商顺序谈判时，一个供应商的低于成本定价能让零售商从另一供应商处榨取租金，从而零售商与该供应商联合利润增加，但福利可能上升或下降，为法院判断此类定价是否反竞争提供建议。
We show that below-cost pricing can arise in intermediate goods markets when a monopolist retailer negotiates sequentially with two suppliers of substitute products. Below-cost pricing by one supplier allows the retailer to extract rents from the second supplier. Thus, the retailer and one supplier can increase their joint profit at the expense of the second supplier. We consider the welfare implications of below-cost pricing (welfare can increase or decrease as a result of below-cost pricing) and provide suggestions for when the courts should view below-cost pricing in intermediate goods markets as anticompetitive and when they should not.