The Strategic Effects of Batch Processing
研究企业在销售竞争前承诺采用批量技术时的双寡头博弈，发现批量大小影响单位成本时，子博弈完美均衡销量比连续成本函数的一次博弈更竞争，且批量大小与单位成本关系不同时，产量可能超过销量。
We study a duopoly game in which firms commit to a batch technology before competing in sales quantities. Adopting a batch technology requires the quantity produced to equal an integer number of batches and allows sales to be less than production. When larger batch sizes lower unit production costs (as in the U.S. airline industry with its economies of density), subgame perfect equilibrium sales quantities are unique and more competitive than the Cournot equilibrium quantities of a one‐shot game with continuous total cost functions. When larger batch sizes yield higher unit costs, equilibrium production can exceed equilibrium sales.