The cost-effectiveness of different Solutions to the European sulphur problem
构建了一个包含20个欧洲国家的硫沉降模型，计算在不同国家行为假设下实现临界负荷目标的成本，发现短视非合作行为下合作能大幅节约成本，而理性知情行为下合作节约有限。
In this article we present a simple model of the European sulphur problem. The model comprises 20 European countries. Each country is assumed to have a deposition target, which is set in such a way that the annual deposition per unit area does not exceed a ‘critical load’. We use this model to calculate the total cost of fulfilling the targets under different assumptions about the behaviour of the countries. It is shown that, given an assumption about myopic non-cooperative behaviour on the part of each country, there will be substantial cost savings if the countries agree to cooperate on a cost-effective solution instead. However, when the countries are assumed to be rational and well informed, there will only be small cost savings from cooperation.