Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and Monetary Union
分析货币联盟成员身份如何激励名义工资灵活性（如工资指数化和缩短合同期限），并探讨这种灵活性对福利的影响，指出其可能因价格波动加剧而降低福利。
Membership in a monetary union implies stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non‐membership. This counteracts the stabilisation policy cost of giving up monetary independence. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an individual monetary policy. It is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare‐decreasing because of the accompanying rise in price variability. The interaction between wage setting and central bank behaviour may result in either multiple equilibria or a unique full‐indexation equilibrium.