Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
研究玩家时间偏好不同时重复博弈的可行支付集和均衡支付集，发现可行集通常大于阶段博弈凸包，且并非所有可行支付都能被均衡支撑，并给出了两人重复博弈中纳什和子博弈完美均衡支付集的简单刻画。
When players have identical time preferences, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs coincides with the convex hull of the underlying stage- game payoffs. Moreover, all feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained by equilibria if the players are sufficiently patient. Neither of these facts generalizes to the case of different time preferences. First, players can mutually benefit from trading payoffs across time. Hence, the set of feasible repeated game payoffs is typically larger than the convex hull of the underlying stage-game payoffs. Second, it is not usually the case that every trade plan that guarantees individually rational payoffs can be sustained by an equilibrium, no matter how patient the players are. This paper provides a simple characterization of the sets of Nash and of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games.