The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises
基于188家公司5年数据，研究发现所有权结构影响CEO加薪决定因素：管理层控制的企业倾向于最大化CEO薪酬，而外部控制的企业则倾向于最小化CEO薪酬。
Abstract We examine how ownership configuration affects the determination of CEO pay raises. Based on a sample of 188 firms over a 5‐year period, it was found that pay raises were based on distinctly different factors, depending on the ownership profile of the firm. In management‐controlled firms—where no single major owner exists—results suggest an overarching pay philosophy: maximize CEO pay, subject to demonstration of face legitimacy of that pay. In externally‐controlled firms—where a major (nonmanager) owner exists—results suggest a very different philosophy: minimize CEO pay, subject to the ability to attract/retain a satisfactory CEO.