Does shareholder primacy lead to a decline in managerial accountability?
质疑股东至上能提升管理者问责制的观点，认为它反而导致会计违规增多和高管薪酬飙升，基于安然时代财务丑闻的实证证据支持这一论点。
Shareholder primacy is increasingly considered to be the most effective way to foster managerial (corporate) accountability. Contrary to this now standard argument, we consider that shareholder primacy, rather than gatekeeper failure, is directly responsible for the multiplication of accounting irregularities and the dramatic increase in executive compensations. To defend this thesis, we propose a new reading of Berle and Means (1932), Galbraith (1973) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), stressing the logical failure of a control of the business firm provided for by stock markets: the implementation of shareholder primacy implies a partial disconnection between access to internal knowledge and empowerment. In turn, this disconnection favours deceptive behaviours on the part of corporate insiders. Empirical evidence mostly based on Enron-era financial scandals illustrates our argument.