Is the Conventional View of Discount Window Borrowing Consistent with the Behavior of Weekly Reporting Banks?
利用美联储各区的周报银行贴现窗口借款数据，检验Goodfriend的借入准备金模型，发现银行借款决策与联邦基金利率和贴现率利差及前期借款关系微弱，且银行在任一维持期借款概率仅2.7%，支持了贴现窗口官员施加的骚扰成本观点。
Discount window borrowing by weekly reporting banks disaggregated by Federal Reserve district is used to estimate Marvin Goodfriend's (1983) model of borrowed reserves. Little evidence is found to support the argument that a bank's borrowing decision is determined by the spread between the funds rate and the discount rate and by prior bank borrowing. A weekly reporting bank has only a 2.7 percent chance of visiting the discount window during any given maintenance period. This result is consistent with the presence of considerable harassment costs imposed by the discount window officer. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.