The Self-Regulation of Commodity Exchanges: The Case of Market Manipulation
质疑经济学家认为交易所会主动防范市场操纵的观点，指出交易所成员忽视对边际交易者和价格信息的影响、交易所间竞争有限及集体行动问题，导致自我监管不足。通过10家交易所历史分析，发现其很少采取反操纵措施，表明自我监管难以有效遏制市场操纵。
Influential economists argue that government regulation of manipulative practices in financial markets is unnecessary because exchanges have incentives to take nearly first-best precautions against the exercise of market power. This article shows that the theoretical arguments underlying this proposition are weak because exchange members are likely to ignore the effects of manipulation on inframarginal traders and price informativeness, competition between exchanges may be limited, and collective action problems preclude efficient exchange intervention. For these reasons, exchanges will likely take few precautions against market power. An examination of the history of self-regulation at 10 exchanges prior to the passage of laws proscribing manipulation shows that they took few, if any, measures to curb manipulation. Since the characteristics of manipulation imply that it can be deterred efficiently through the use of harm-based sanctions, this theory and evidence strongly suggest that self-regulation is an inefficient means to reduce monopoly power in financial markets.