Preferences over Equality in the Presence of Costly Income Sorting
研究了在收入分类代价高昂的社会中，个人对再分配的偏好，发现即使收入高于平均水平的相对富裕选民也可能支持完全平等以减少分类动机，该偏好适用于相对平等的收入分布。
We analyze preferences over redistribution in societies with costly (positive) sorting according to income. We identify a new motivation for redistribution, where individuals support taxation in order to reduce the incentives to sort. We characterize a simple condition over income distributions which implies that even relatively rich voters—with income above the mean—will prefer full equality (and thus no sorting) to societies with costly sorting. We show that the condition is satisfied for relatively equal income distributions. We also relate the condition to several statistical properties which are satisfied by a large family of distribution functions.