University licensing of patents for varietal innovations in agriculture
通过实验研究美国公立大学许可农业专利品种时，不同合同类型（独家/非独家）和收费方式（固定费、提成费或两者结合）对大学收入的影响，发现非独家合同单独使用提成费时收入最高。
Abstract There has been a sharp increase in the number of patented agricultural varieties from public universities in the United States. We develop an experiment to examine the revenue stream to universities from licensing plant‐based innovations. In the experiment we asked subjects to bid for access for a patented input that would be used to produce a differentiated product; treatments were employed to solicit bids that were financed by fees, royalties, and a combination of the two mechanisms under exclusive and nonexclusive contracts. The literature studying the economics of downstream duopoly competition in quantity suggests that revenues for the innovator would be greatest under a nonexclusive contract that uses fees and royalties. In our experiment we allow more than two firms to obtain access to the patent in the nonexclusive treatments, and our empirical results suggest that innovator revenues are greatest when royalties are used alone in a nonexclusive contract.