解决最后贷款人设施引发的道德风险问题的方案

Solutions to the Moral Hazard Problem Arising from The Lender‐of‐last‐resort Facility

Journal of Economic Surveys · 1999
被引 24
人大 AABS 2

中文导读

综述了为缓解最后贷款人设施带来的道德风险而提出的各种政策措施,帮助读者了解如何平衡流动性救助与银行审慎经营之间的关系。

Abstract

The provision of liquid funds via a lender‐of‐last‐resort facility has been the chief means by which governments have chosen to prevent or stay bank runs. The introduction of such a facility, however, leads to a moral hazard problem which weakens each financial manager’s commitment to sound banking, and hence may ultimately make the few bank runs which do occur more dramatic in both size and seriousness. In this paper I provide a survey of the various policy measures which have been proposed to mitigate the effects of the moral hazard problem arising from the introduction of a lender‐of‐last‐resort facility.

最后贷款人道德风险银行挤兑政策应对