The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies
用多任务职业关注模型分析政府官员的激励问题，发现机构追求多重使命会削弱激励，模糊使命更甚，因此多使命机构自主权更少；专业化能提升激励，并与官僚制事实比较。
The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy. The paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency, and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives. Last, the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on Government bureaucracies.