COMPETITION OR PREDATION? CONSUMER COORDINATION, STRATEGIC PRICING AND PRICE FLOORS IN NETWORK MARKETS*
研究了网络效应下掠夺性定价的成功可能性，发现主流反掠夺规则可能降低效率与消费者福利，并指出基于成本的价格下限争论无益，Ordover-Willig规则理论上错误，有效价格下限需依赖不可观测的消费者预期与协调过程。
Although network effects can make predation more likely to succeed, we find that the leading anti-predation rules may lower or raise efficiency and consumer welfare in network markets. We find that: (a) the extensive debates about the ‘correct’ measure of cost on which to base price floors are unlikely to be productive; (b) the Ordover-Willig rule that is widely thought to be correct in theory but difficult to apply in practice is, in fact, incorrect in theory; and (c) efficient price floors would have to depend on consumer expectations and coordination processes that are unlikely to be observable in practice.