Year-End Tax Planning of Top Management: Evidence from High-Frequency Payroll Data
利用丹麦高频工资数据和税制改革变化，研究发现5%至7%的高管通过调整奖金发放时间或转移常规工资收入来规避年终税款，其中奖金时间调整对税收最敏感。
Using Danish high-frequency payroll data and tax reform variation, we detect year-end tax avoidance among top managers. Five to seven percent of top managers exploit year-end tax planning strategies to save taxes. Around 30 percent of the top managers engaging in year-end tax avoidance do so by retiming bonus payments while the rest shift regular wage income. However, bonus timing is most tax-sensitive. When considering all of the top managers receiving a December bonus, we find that more than one-quarter retime the bonus payment, whereas only 5 percent of those not receiving a bonus shift regular wage income.