Subsidization and Stabilization: Optimal Employment Policy under Aggregate Uncertainty
研究存在外部性和技术冲击的经济中，如何通过自筹资金的线性就业补贴实现最优配置，并刻画补贴随经济条件变化的特征。
The authors study an economy where externalities provide an explicit role for intervention and technology shocks generate aggregate uncertainty. In laissez-faire there is too much unemployment. However, the authors show how to support the optimal allocation as a decentralized equilibrium using a self-financing linear employment subsidy. Generally, this subsidy is a function of economic conditions, and they characterize the way in which it varies with the shock. A special case of the authors' results indicates that a simple restriction on technology, homotheticity, implies the optimal subsidy is constant or independent of unemployment. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.