A Median Voter Model of Social Security
用连续时间世代交叠模型分析社会保障水平如何由中位选民决定，发现中位选民受流动性约束，且每位选民期望的社会保障水平随现有水平递减，导致初始投票时社会保障水平会超过稳态值。
This paper presents a theoretical median voter analysis of the determination of the level of social security. The framework for the analysis is a continuous-time, overlapping-generations model with nonaltruistic households facing borrowing constraints in the capital market. A majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist in which the median voter is liquidity-constrained. The desired level of social security for each voter is a declining function of the preexisting level of social security. As a consequence, in a sequence of votes on social security beginning with a zero level, the program initially overshoots its steady state value. Copyright 1989 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.